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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
J. Rodney Johnson * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The General Assembly enacted legislation dealing with wills, 
trusts, and estates that added or amended a number of sections of 
the Virginia Code in its 2002 Session. In addition, there were ten 
Supreme Court of Virginia opinions and two United States Dis-
trict Court opinions raising issues of interest to the general prac-
titioner as well as the specialist in wills, trusts, and estates dur-
ing the period covered by this review. This article reports on all of 
these legislative and judicial developments. 1 
II. LEGISLATION 
A Intestate Succession-Appointment of Administrator-
Priorities 
When a person dies intestate, the basic rule of Virginia Code 
section 64.1-118 has been to give a surviving spouse the first pri-
ority to qualify as administrator on the decedent's estate or, in 
the absence of a spouse who wishes and is able to qualify, to allow 
"such of the others entitled to distribution as the court or clerk 
shall see fit" to qualify. 2 However, anecdotal evidence before the 
General Assembly indicated that the spousal priority was produc-
ing unsatisfactory results in some cases where a step-parent 
spouse received only one-third of the decedent's estate and the 
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law. 
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Virginia Code sections, they will 
often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated, 
these section numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections and to the 2002 
Supplement for the new sections. 
2. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-118 (Cum. Supp. 2001) (predating the 2002 amendment). 
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decedent's children received the other two-thirds.3 Although nor-
mally not a problem in cases where harmonious relations existed 
within the blended families and the step-parent spouse was re-
garded as a "good" person by the step-children, the step-parent 
administrator's exclusive management and control of the dece-
dent's personal estate regularly led to problems in the other 
cases. In addition, the second priority, for "other distributees," 
was becoming an increasing source of problems because of its 
typical "race to the courthouse" outcome. Too often, it was 
claimed, the fleetest of foot was not the best-and sometimes 
might even be the worst-person to serve as administrator for a 
variety of reasons. House ,Bill 1732 was introduced in the 2001 
Session in an attempt to remedy some of these problems, but, 
notwithstanding its passage by the General Assembly, an unex-
plained gubernatorial amendment accepted during the 2001 Spe-
cial Session provided "[t]hat the provisions of this act shall not 
become effective unless re-enacted by the 2002 Session of the 
General Assembly and signed by the Governor."4 
However, instead of re-enacting this 2001 act, the 2002 Session 
passed a substantially different bill that appears to resolve both 
of the above-described problems.5 Under its provisions, qualifica-
tion before the clerk during the first thirty days following an in-
testate's death is restricted to a sole distributee or, if there are 
two or more distributees, to a distributee who presents written 
qualification waivers from the other competent distributees.6 Ac-
cordingly, the only persons who will be permitted to qualify in the 
clerk's office during the first thirty days following an intestate's 
death will be: (1) a spouse who is a sole distributee;7 (2) a spouse 
3. See id.§§ 64.1-1, -11 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
4. H.B. 1732, Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 2001, 
ch. 795, cl. 2, 2001 Va. Acts 1085). 
5. H.B. 315, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act of Mar. 22, 2002, 
ch. 197, 2002 Va. Acts 200) (codified at VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-118 (Repl. Vol. 2002)). 
6. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.l-118(A)(l) (Repl. Vol. 2002). The statute allows an eligible 
distributee to qualify personally or to appoint a "designee" to serve in the distributee's 
place. Id. Although this statute speaks in the singular, the clerk may, of course, qualify 
two or more distributees (or designees) as co-administrators during this thirty-day period 
so long as there is agreement or waivers from all concerned. See id. § 1-13.15 (Repl. Vol. 
2001). In estates with multiple distributees, such multiple qualification will eliminate the 
need for the administrators to post surety upon their official bond if they otherwise satisfy 
the requirements. Id.§ 64.1-121 (Rep!. Vol. 2002). 
7. The surviving spouse may be a sole distributee because the surviving spouse is the 
parent of all the decedent's children or descendants of deceased children, or because the 
decedent left no children or descendants of deceased children. Id. § 64.1-11 (Repl. Vol. 
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step-parent who has the consent of the decedent's competent chil-
dren and descendants of deceased children; (3) any distributee 
who is a sole taker, or (4) any distributee who presents written 
waivers from all other competent distributees.8 Thus the "wrong" 
spouse step-parent will no longer be able to qualify during the 
thirty-day priority period (due to lack of waivers), but there 
should be no problem with the "right" spouse step-parent qualify-
ing (with waivers) during this period. After this thirty-day period 
has passed, the qualification process reverts to a "race to the 
clerk's office" among the distributees with one important excep-
tion. If, during the initial thirty-day period, more than one dis-
tributee notifies the clerk of an intent to seek qualification when 
this period has expired, the clerk is prohibited from appointing 
anyone until "the clerk has given all such distributees an oppor-
tunity to be heard."9 Thus the fleetest of foot will no longer neces-
sarily become the administrator, as often happened in the past. 
Instead, the clerk will hear the arguments of all who gave such 
notice and pick the one best qualified for the task.10 This is not to 
suggest that time no longer has meaning because, presumably, if 
all who seek appointment are equally qualified, the clerk will ap-
point the one who made the first request. A third provision 
slightly recasts prior law by authorizing the clerk to appoint "one 
or more of the creditors or any other person" as administrator af-
ter sixty days have passed since the death of the intestate.11 
Lastly, the new rules authorize the court to appoint administra-
tors pursuant to the same rules as the clerk, and, in order to pro-
vide for flexibility in unusual cases, "when the court determines 
that it is in the best interests of an intestate's estate, the court 
may depart therefrom at any time and appoint such person as the 
court, in the exercise of its discretion, deems most appropriate."12 
2002). 
8. Id.§ 64.1-118 (Repl. Vol. 2002). 
9. Id.§ 64.1-118(A)(2). 
10. Id. 
11. Id.§ 64.l-118(A)(3). Prior law permitted such a qualification after thirty days had 
expired, and imposed certain notice requirements in favor of any surviving spouse. Id. 
(Editor's note). These notice requirements are continued by the new law in favor of any 
sole distributee, whether or not a spouse. Id. (Editor's note). 
12. Id.§ 64.l-118(A)(4). 
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B. Power of Attorney-Safe-Deposit Box-Access 
It has become a very normal practice for persons who execute 
wills to avoid the default dispositive provisions of Virginia succes-
sion law upon their death, to also execute business and medical 
powers of attorney to avoid the default management provisions of 
Virginia's conservatorship13 and guardianship14 laws upon their 
incapacity.15 It is also a normal practice for persons leasing safe-
deposit boxes for the safeguarding of their valuables to place their 
wills and powers of attorney therein. The 1984 Session responded 
to the post-death access problems relating to wills in safe-deposit 
boxes, when the decedent is the sole lessee or when no co-lessee is 
reasonably available, by adding Virginia Code section 6.1-332.1 to 
provide permissive authority for a "company or bank" to allow 
certain persons to make a supervised search of the decedent's box 
for a will and to remove "the will or testamentary instrument for 
transmission to the appropriate clerk."16 
The 2002 Session of the General Assembly, faced with post-
incapacity access problems relating to powers of attorney in safe-
deposit boxes when the incapacitated principal is the sole lessee 
or when no co-lessee is reasonably available, amended Virginia 
Code section 6.1-332.1 in an attempt to provide a similar permis-
sive remedy.17 However the amendment's too-literal parallelism 
raises a variety of interpretation issues because wills and powers 
of attorney are quite dissimilar and they operate in different con-
texts. Although it makes sense to provide for access to a safe-
deposit box by "the spouse or next of kin ... or by a court clerk or 
other interested person" when dealing with a will, one wonders 
about the identity of the latter two persons vis-a-vis a power of 
13. A conservator is "a person appointed by the court who is responsible for managing 
the estate and financial affairs of an incapacitated person." Id. § 37.1-134.6 (Cum. Supp. 
2002). 
14. A guardian is "a person appointed by the court who is responsible for the personal 
affairs of an incapacitated person, including responsibility for making decisions regarding 
the person's support, care, health, safety, habitation, education, and therapeutic treat-
ment, and, if not inconsistent with an order of commitment, residence." Id. 
15. The statute authorizing the general durable power of attorney is Virginia Code 
section 11-9.1. Id. § 11-9.1 (Repl. Vol. 1999). The Health Care Decisions Act, found at Vir-
ginia Code section 54.1-2981, governs "advance directives," a term that includes docu-
ments also known as medical powers of attorney and living wills. Id. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 
(Repl. Vol. 2002). 
16. Id. § 6.1-332.1 (Repl. Vol. 1999). 
17. Id.§ 6.1-332.l(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002). 
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attorney. 18 In the case of a death, the authorized person may only 
remove testamentary instruments and then only "for transmis-
sion to the appropriate clerk."19 But in the case of an incapacity, 
the authorized person-though permitted to remove any power of 
attorney-is given no instructions concerning its delivery.20 In 
addition, although the statute's language that a "company or 
bank may require proof of death or incapacity in the form of a let-
ter from a licensed physician, as it deems necessary "21 should 
present no problem in the case of a will, there are two alternative 
definitions of incapacity.22 One of these definitions relates to in-
capacity to handle one's personal affairs that will be handled by a 
guardian, and the other definition relates to incapacity to handle 
one's estate and financial affairs that will be handled by a conser-
vator. 23 According to the statutory definition, a person is "inca-
pacitated" if either of these alternative tests are met.24 But, one 
asks in the hypothetical, if X's incapacity relates only to personal 
affairs, should this authorize others to enter X's safe-deposit box 
and withdraw X's business power of attorney? Or if X's incapacity 
relates only to financial affairs, should this authorize others to 
enter X's safe-deposit box and remove X's medical power of attor-
ney? Although none of the matters mentioned herein is of over-
whelming significance, it is nevertheless submitted that this well-
18. Id. When dealing with a will, one presumes that "court clerk" refers to the clerk of 
the court that has jurisdiction to probate the decedent's will and thereby make it an effec-
tive legal document, and that an "interested" person is one who has a potential property 
interest in the decedent's estate. However, it is unclear to whom these terms refer when 
dealing with a power of attorney, although the latter would certainly include the primary 
agent named therein. 
19. Id.§ 6.1-332.l(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002). 
20. The primary agent named therein would be the obvious, but not necessarily the 
exclusive, possibility. 
21. Id.§ 6.1-332.l(C). 
22. "Incapacitated person" is defined as: 
[A]n adult who has been found by a court to be incapable of receiving and 
evaluating information effectively or responding to people, events, or envi-
ronments to such an extent that the individual lacks the capacity to (i) meet 
the essential requirements for his health, care, safety, or therapeutic needs 
without the assistance or protection of a guardian or (ii) manage property or 
financial affairs or provide for his or her support or for the support of his le-
gal dependents without the assistance or protection of a conservator. A find-
ing that the individual displays poor judgment, alone, shall not be considered 
sufficient evidence that the individual is an incapacitated person within the 
meaning of this definition. 
Id.§ 37.1-134.6 (Cum. Supp. 2002). 
23. Id. 
24. See id. 
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intentioned statute should be clarified in the 2003 Session, at 
which time the General Assembly might also consider providing 
for access to another document sometimes placed in a person's 
safe-deposit box, a "living will." 
There is a further problem tangentially raised by this statute 
that has been mostly in the background for some time now, but 
which needs to be addressed by the General Assembly if this 
statute is to continue in existence. It is generally assumed 
throughout the law that no legal rights or relations are created 
under any document until it is delivered by its author.25 Yet, this 
2002 legislation appears to be drafted on the assumption that a 
power of attorney received by the agent named therein would be 
effective even though it was never delivered by the principal and 
even though it is not received by the agent until a point when the 
principal, due to incapacity, is legally incapable of making deliv-
ery. 26 In order to avoid this delivery problem in practice, many at-
torneys advise their clients who are unwilling for whatever rea-
son to make an immediate delivery of a power of attorney to the 
chosen agent, to make a delivery instead to a third party, in es-
crow, with the escrowee to make physical delivery to the agent 
upon the occurrence of facts or circumstances stipulated by the 
principal. But anecdotal evidence and the circumstances that 
gave rise to the introduction of the legislation under considera-
tion indicate that many persons retain personal possession of 
their powers and thus the delivery problem is broader than the 
scope of the present statute. For instance, this statute will have 
no operation in those cases where there is a co-lessee who makes 
the document available to the agent, or in the cases where the in-
capacitated person keeps the power of attorney at the home or of-
fice where it is discovered, following the principal's incapacity by 
those who are cleaning up. Thus any remedial legislation that 
addresses the delivery issue only in the limited context of safe-
deposit cases will miss the major problem areas. 
25. As stated by the Supreme Court of Mississippi: 
[A]s between the parties, the principal and the purported attorney-in-fact, all 
that is requisite to the enforceability of the power of attorney is execution and 
delivery in the same sense that, as between grantor and grantee, all that is 
necessary for a deed to be valid and enforceable is that the grantor execute it 
and deliver it. 
Kountouris v. Varvaris, 476 So. 2d 599, 604 (Miss. 1985). For a discussion of the delivery 
issue in the context of powers of attorney, see Durable Powers of Attorney, Tax Mgmt. 
(BNA), No. 859, at A-18 (2000). 
26. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 6.1-332.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002). 
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C. Incorporation by Reference-Worthless Statute Retains Status 
Quo 
The 2001 Session of the General Assembly added Virginia Code 
section 64.1-45.2, titled "Incorporation by reference; letter of in-
struction or memorandum into a will, power of attorney or trust 
instrument."27 An analysis of this confused and confusing legisla-
tion in these pages last year concluded that it: (1) made no posi-
tive contribution to Virginia law; and (2) created negative federal 
income and estate tax consequences for the settlors of irrevocable 
inter vivos trusts.28 In order to eliminate these federal tax prob-
lems, the 2002 Session amended this statute to provide that no 
provision incorporated thereunder "is enforceable if ... it alters 
the possession or enjoyment of trust property or the income there-
from as directed by the trust instrument."29 This legislation also 
proclaims "[t]hat the provisions of this act are declaratory of ex-
isting law"30-a statement that the General Assembly makes, on 
occasion, to indicate that an enactment is a clarification of a stat-
ute, or a codification of a common law rule, as opposed to a 
change in the law.31 Notwithstanding the elimination of the fed-
eral tax problems, the fact remains that this misbegotten statute 
makes no positive contribution to Virginia law; it has the poten-
tial to lead some attorneys into error and should therefore be re-
pealed. 
D. Probate Avoidance-Small Estates 
The Virginia Code contains a number of statutes designed to 
facilitate the transfer of specific kinds of property from the dead 
to the living without requiring the recipients to go through the 
probate process. These statutes are permissive in nature. Al-
though they fully protect the transferor who elects to rely upon 
27. Id.§ 64.1-45.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001). 
28. J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 35 
U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 856-60 (2001). 
29. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-45.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2002). 
30. Id.§ 64.1-45.2 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (editor's note). 
31. When the meaning of the term, "declaratory of existing law," was before the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, it stated that "[w]hile the legislature can only make law 
and cannot declare what the existing law is, the statement by the General Assembly 
clearly evidences an intent for the statute to be applied retroactively." Estate of Ridenour 
v. Comm'r, 36 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 1994). 
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them, the potential transferee cannot force their use. A further 
common denominator in most of these statutes prior to July 1, 
2001 was a requirement that the value of the property in question 
not exceed $10,000. However, the 2001 Session of the General As-
sembly increased this ceiling to $15,000 in six instances,32 and the 
2002 Session increased it in three more: (1) deposits in banks;33 
(2) deposits in savings institutions;34 and (3) deposits in credit un-
ions.35 
E. Small Estates-Waiver of Inventory and Settlement 
Prior to July 1, 2001, Virginia Code section 26-12.3, designed to 
facilitate the probate process in small estates, provided that 
"[w]hen an estate does not exceed $10,000 in value, and an heir, 
beneficiary or creditor whose claim exceeds the value of the estate 
seeks qualification, the clerk shall waive inventory under§ 26-12 
and settlement under§ 26-17."36 An attempt by the 2001 Session 
to clarify the meaning of the word "estate" in this section resulted 
in the introduction of significant ambiguity into its operation.37 
The 2002 Session corrects all of these interpretation problems 
and also increases the section's ceiling to $15,000.38 
F. Small Estate-Triennial Accounts 
Virginia Code section 26-17 .3 is the general statute requiring 
fiduciaries governed by Chapter 2 of Title 26 to account before 
their jurisdiction's commissioner of accounts for all receipts and 
32. These instances are noted in Johnson, supra note 28, at 855. 
33. VA. CODE ANN.§ 6.1-71 (Cum. Supp. 2002). 
34. Id. § 6.1-194.58 (Cum. Supp. 2002). 
35. Id.§ 6.1-225.49 (Cum. Supp. 2002). 
36. Id. § 26-12.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (predating the 2001 and 2002 amendments). 
37. These problems created by the 2001 amendments are noted in Johnson, supra 
note 28, at 860-61. 
38. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-12.3 (Cum. Supp. 2002). The complete text of this section now 
reads as follows: 
Id. 
When a decedent's personal estate passing by testate or intestate succession 
does not exceed $15,000 in value and an heir, beneficiary or creditor whose 
claim exceeds the value of such estate seeks qualification, the clerk shall 
waive inventory under § 26-12 and settlement under § 26-17.3. This section 
shall not apply if the decedent died owning any real estate over which the 
person seeking qualification would have the power of sale. 
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disbursements during each accounting period.39 The initial ac-
counting period: (1) for a conservator, guardian of a minor's es-
tate, committee, and trustee under Virginia Code sec-
tion 37.1-134.20 is the first four months following qualification;40 
(2) for a personal representative is the first twelve months follow-
ing qualification;41 and (3) for a testamentary trustee required to 
account42 is the remainder of the calendar year in which the trust 
was funded.43 Thereafter, all of these fiduciaries have an obliga-
tion to account annually so long as they remain in office. 44 
In order to reduce the annual accounting burden on small es-
tates, Virginia Code section 26-20 has given commissioners of ac-
counts the discretion to allow fiduciaries listed in Virginia Code 
section 26-17.3 to account on a three-year basis iftheir estates do 
not exceed $10,000.45 The 2002 Session increased this ceiling to 
$15,000.46 Although not a part of the 2002 legislation (except for 
the increased ceiling), it is interesting to note that notwithstand-
ing the varying periods established for initial accounts noted 
above, Virginia Code section 26-20 provides that the initial ac-
counting period for all fiduciaries listed in Virginia Code sec-
39. Id. § 26-17.3 (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
40. Id.§ 26-17.4(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001). The title of this statute also refers to "receivers 
under§ 55-44," but the 1999 Session repealed Virginia Code section 55-44 ("Control of es-
tate of a married woman who is a minor"), and deleted the reference thereto within the 
body of Virginia Code section 26-17.4. See H.B. 1633, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) 
(enacted as Act of Feb. 27, 1999, ch. 16, 1999 Va. Acts 22). 
41. VA. CODE ANN.§ 26-17.5(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
42. Subject to certain limitations, a testamentary trustee's obligation to account may 
be waived by the testator or by the trust's adult beneficiaries. See id.§ 26-17.7 (Repl. Vol. 
2001). 
43. Id. § 26-17.6(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001). There are two exceptions to this rule: (1) when 
at least one of the trustees is a corporation qualified under Virginia Code section 6.1-5; 
and (2) when at least one of the trustees is permitted by the IRS to file income tax returns 
on a fiscal year basis, then the trustees may elect to file their initial account for the period 
of the trust's first "fiscal year." Id.§ 26-17.6(C). 
44. This annual period is expressed: (1) for a conservator, guardian of a minor's es-
tate, committee, and trustee under Virginia Code section 37.1-134.20 as "each succeeding 
twelve-month period," id. § 26-17.4(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001); (2) for a personal representative 
as "each succeeding twelve month period," id. § 26-17.5(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001); and (3) for a 
testamentary trustee required to account as "each calendar year thereafter," id. 
§ 26-17.6(A) (Repl. Vol. 2001); except for three categories of such trustees who may elect, 
instead, each succeeding "fiscal year:" (a) trustees who qualified prior to July 1, 1993 and 
elected to operate on a fiscal year basis, id. § 26-17.6(B); (b) trustees who qualify at any 
time, one of which is a corporation qualified under§ 6.1-5, id. § 26-l 7.6(C); and (c) trustees 
permitted by IRS to file income tax returns on a fiscal year basis, id. 
45. See VA. CODE ANN.§§ 26-17.3, -20 (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
46. Id. § 26-20. 
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tion 26-17.3 is one year if their fiduciary estate does not exceed 
$15,000.47 
G. Notice in Probate-Enforcement 
In response to Fourteenth Amendment Due Process issues 
raised by the Virginia Bar Association, and its lobbying efforts 
over a five-year period, the 1993 Session of the General Assembly 
enacted Virginia Code section 64.1-122.2 to provide for after-the-
fact notice to certain interested parties within thirty days follow-
ing the ex parte probate of a will in a testate case or the qualifica-
tion of an administrator in an intestate case.48 However, although 
the statute has provided that the "personal representative or pro-
ponent of the will shall record in the clerk's office" an affidavit 
describing to whom, where, and when this notice was sent (or 
that no notice was required), the statute has contained no time 
frame or enforcement provisions in connection therewith.49 The 
2002 Session remedied these deficiencies by amending Virginia 
Code section 64.1-122.2 to provide that the affidavit must be re-
corded "within four months" and, absent compliance, "the Com-
missioner of Accounts shall issue, through the sheriff or other 
proper officer, a summons to such fiduciary requiring him to com-
ply and if he shall not, the Commissioner shall enforce the filing 
of the affidavit in the manner set forth in§ 26-13."50 
47. The statute reads as follows: "If the principal sum held by any fiduciary men-
tioned in § 26-17.3 does not exceed $15,000, such fiduciary shall exhibit his accounts be-
fore the commissioner within four months after the expiration of one year from the date of 
the order conferring his authority as provided in§ 26-17.3 ... . "Id. 
48. H.B. 302, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1993) (enacted as Act of Feb. 9, 1993, ch. 
4, 1993 Va. Acts 3) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-122.2 (Cum. Supp. 1993)) (effective 
January 1, 1994). The background and basic operation of this statute are discussed in J. 
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 27 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 833, 833-35 (1993). 
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-122.2(F) (Rep. Vol. 2002). The statute's provision that "[a] 
commissioner of accounts shall not approve any settlement filed by a personal representa-
tive until the affidavit described in this subsection has been recorded" did serve as an in-
direct enforcement provision in some cases. Id. However, as Virginia Code section 26-17.5 
provides that a personal representative's first settlement is not due in the commissioner's 
office until sixteen months after the personal representative's qualification, this sixteen-
month enforcement provision for a thirty-day notice was a classic illustration of "too little, 
too late." Id. § 26-17.5 (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
50. Id. § 64.l-122.2(F) (Rep. Vol. 2002). The concluding phrase, "in the manner set 
forth in § 26-13," refers to the enforcement of a recalcitrant fiduciary's duty to file an in-
ventory by reporting the matter to the circuit court for further action as described therein. 
Id. 
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H. Presumption of Death-September 11th Exception 
Virginia Code section 64.1-105, dealing with the presumed 
death of a person who has not been heard from for a period of 
seven years, requires an unnecessarily long wait in some in-
stances where it is reasonable to assume that one has in fact died 
at an earlier time.51 Thus, the General Assembly has passed spe-
cific and general exceptions to this seven-year rule to cover some 
of these cases.52 The 2002 Session added a new exception, passed 
as emergency legislation effective February 28, 2002,53 as follows: 
1. Presumption of death exception. 
A. Notwithstanding the provisions of§ 64.1-105 of the Code of Vir-
ginia, any person (i) who has been documented to have been in that 
portion of the Pentagon damaged by the terrorist attack of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, or on American Airlines Flight 77 on September 11, 
2001, when it was flown into the Pentagon; (ii) who has disappeared 
as a result of this terrorist attack and has not been heard from in 
three or more months since such terrorist attack; and (iii) whose 
body has not been found or whose remains have not been identified 
through scientific testing shall be presumed dead in any instance or 
cause in which his death shall be a question. The provisions of Chap-
ter 5 (§ 64.1-105 et seq.) of Title 64.1 shall apply to such person, his 
alleged heirs, devisees, legatees, and next of kin. 
B. Upon petition to the Circuit Court of Arlington County by any 
heir, devisee, legatee, or next of kin or executor or administrator of 
such person's estate, the court, upon good cause shown, may find 
that such person is deceased and issue an order of the court declar-
ing that such person is deceased.54 
Although this special legislation will be very helpful to the suc-
cessors in interest of those who are believed, but cannot be 
51. See id. § 64.1-105 (Repl. Vol. 2002). 
52. See, e.g., id. § 64.1-105.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995) (dealing with cases of persons disap-
pearing in floods resulting from Hurricane Camille); id. § 64.1-105.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995) 
(dealing with persons disappearing from a ship or vessel at sea or on board an aircraft 
which disappears at sea). 
53. S.B. 575, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2002) (enacted as Act ofFeb.28, 2002, ch. 
58, cl. 2, 2002 Va. Act 105). Although the effective date for legislation from a given session 
is normally July 1 of the session year, a bill passed as emergency legislation becomes effec-
tive on the date it is signed by the governor which, in this case, was February 28, 2002. 
Another bill, identical in all respects except for originating in the Senate, was enacted as 
Act of Apr. 2, 2002, ch. 400, 2002 Va. Acts 626. 
54. Id. cl.1. This legislation was passed as"§ 1," and it will not be codified in the Vir-
ginia Code. However, the test of this provision does appear in an editor's note appended to 
Virginia Code section 64.1-105 (Repl. Vol. 2002). 
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proven, to have lost their lives in the two terrorist attacks de-
scribed therein, it makes no provision for the successors in inter-
est of those who may have similarly perished in the other two ter-
rorist attacks that occurred on the same day-the destruction of 
the World Trade Center in New York and the crash of United Air-
lines Flight 93 in Pennsylvania. It is possible that one or more 
Virginians, and/or one or more non-Virginians owning property in 
Virginia, may have died in one of these two non-covered tragedies 
without there being any traditional evidence thereof, and it is 
submitted that an exception from the seven-year rule should be 
available to their successors in interest in Virginia courts.55 How-
ever, it is suggested that the 2003 Session abandon the practice of 
drafting to respond to unique fact situations and instead draft a 
"generic tragedy" statute56 that would avoid for future incidents a 
secondary problem presented by the 2002 legislation-the legisla-
tive time-lag. In addition to not responding to the needs of all 
September 11th-affected persons, it was more than five months 
after September 11th before the 2002 "specific tragedy" legisla-
tion provided any assistance for those to whom it was applica-
ble.57 But, if the 2003 Session should enact a "generic tragedy" ex-
ception to Virginia's seven-year rule, then it will remedy the 2002 
deficiency and the successors in interest of those who lose their 
lives in any terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other tragedy, 
under circumstances where orthodox proof of death is unavail-
able, will be able to seek a judicial determination of death forth-
with, instead of having to await the convening of the following 
Session and the passage of special legislation before the process 
can begin. 
55. The traditional seven-year rule of section 64.1-105 not only operates "internally," 
it also covers Virginians who disappear out-of-state as well as non-Virginians who have 
disappeared leaving property in Virginia. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-105 (Rep!. Vol. 2002). 
56. By way of illustration, New York's generic tragedy exception to its three-year pre-
sumption of death rule provides that "[t]he fact that such person was exposed to a specific 
peril of death may be a sufficient basis for determining at any time after the exposure that 
he or she died less than three years after the date his or her absence commenced." N.Y. 
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW§ 2-1.7(b) (McKinney 2002). The parallel statute in Pennsyl-
vania provides that "[t]he fact that an absentee was exposed to a specific peril of death 
may be a sufficient ground for finding that he died less than seven years after he was last 
heard of." 20 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 5701(c) (2002). 
57. Although enacted as emergency legislation, the 2002 legislation did not become 
effective until February 28, 2002. Va. S.B. 575. 
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I. Fiduciary Accounts-Payment of Taxes 
The 2002 Session of the General Assembly attempted to clarify 
the operation and synchronization of several code sections de-
signed to insure that fiduciary estates satisfy tax obligations 
owed to any unit of government. First, Virginia Code section 
58.1-911 was amended to prohibit the commissioner of accounts 
from approving a personal representative's final account unless 
the commissioner determines that: (1) all state, city, or county 
taxes "assessed and chargeable upon property in the hands of a 
personal representative"; and (2) any Virginia estate tax and in-
terest "imposed on the property by this chapter" has been paid. 58 
Second, Virginia Code section 58.1-22 was amended to prohibit 
the commissioner of accounts from filing a report on the final ac-
count of any fiduciary other than a personal representative, or an 
interim account of any fiduciary, unless the commissioner deter-
mines: (1) that all state, city, or county taxes "assessed and 
chargeable upon property in the hands of' the fiduciary have been 
paid; or (2) that an amount sufficient to pay all charges of ad-
ministration and all taxes "charged against such person in his ca-
pacity as fiduciary" remains in the fiduciary's hands.59 
In addition to the internal interpretation issues mentioned in 
the footnotes, one wonders why Virginia Code section 58.1-911 
operates by prohibiting the commissioner from approving a final 
58. VA. CODE ANN.§ 58.1-911 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). The standard rule 
of construction would say that the antecedent of "the property" in the second portion of 
this statute would be "property in the hands of a personal representative" in the first por-
tion. Such an interpretation would mean that the commissioner's responsibility under this 
statute would not extend to that portion of the Virginia estate taxes levied on non-probate 
property (e.g., insurance payable otherwise than to the estate, survivorship property, etc.), 
or on property passing through the probate process but not "in the hands of' the personal 
representative, i.e., real property not devised to the personal representative which will 
have vested in the heirs (in an intestacy) or devisees (in a testate case). However, as such 
a result clearly could not have been intended, the commissioners charged with implement-
ing this section will undoubtedly read the words "on the property" out of the clause "tax 
imposed on the property by this chapter" and apply the clause as if it simply read "tax im-
posed by this chapter." Id. The "chapter" referred to in the clause "tax imposed on property 
by this chapter" is chapter 9, "The Virginia Estate Tax." Id.§§ 58.1-900 to -938 (Repl. Vol. 
1997 & Cum. Supp. 2002). 
59. Id.§ 58.1-22 (Cum. Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). Although the two parts of this 
statute are stated in the alternative, it appears that they do not cover all possible cases. 
For example, real estate taxes levied against property an incapacitated person owns in 
survivorship with another would not be property "in the hands of' the conservator, and the 
taxes thereon would not be "charged against the conservator" in his fiduciary capacity. See 
id. 
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account, but Virginia Code section 58.1-22 operates by prohibiting 
the commissioner from filing a report on an account. As written, 
Virginia Code section 58.1-911 permits the commissioner to dis-
approve a personal representative's final account and file a report 
with the court,60 Virginia Code section 58.1-22 prohibits the com-
missioner from filing a report on interim accounts made by any 
fiduciary, including a personal representative, and on final ac-
counts when made by any fiduciary other than a personal repre-
sentative.61 One wonders why the commissioner shouldn't be al-
lowed to disapprove a deficient interim or final account and file a 
report thereon with the court in these other cases? Lastly, in this 
non-exhaustive list of questions, what about real estate taxes as-
sessed against a person that were unpaid at death and remain 
unpaid at the time an administrator files a final account with the 
commissioner showing a zero balance on hand? Virginia Code sec-
tion 58.1-22 is not applicable because it applies only to fiduciaries 
"not governed by§ 58.1-911,"62 and that section governs the "final 
account of a personal representative."63 But Virginia Code sec-
tion 58.1-911 fails to provide a remedy because the real estate 
taxes on intestate realty are not "assessed and chargeable upon 
property in the hands of a personal representative."64 Although 
none of the issues raised in connection with these two code sec-
tions are likely to present a major problem in their practical ap-
plication by the commissioners of accounts, they are, neverthe-
less, significant enough to warrant a revisit thereto in the 2003 
Session. 
J. Probated Will-Destruction after Microfilming 
Virginia Code section 17.1-213, dealing with the disposition of 
papers in ended cases, was amended by the 2002 Session to add 
"original wills" to the list of papers that circuit court clerks are 
permitted to destroy, after they have been microfilmed, if they "no 
longer have administrative, fiscal, historical, or legal value to 
warrant continued retention."65 
60. Id.§ 58.1-911 (Cum. Supp. 2002). 
61. Id.§ 58.1-22 (Cum. Supp. 2002). 
62. Id. 
63. Id.§ 58.1-911. 
64. Id. 
65. Id.§ 17.1-213(E) (Cum. Supp. 2002). 
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K. Charitable Corporations-Jurisdiction-Attorney General's 
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The 2002 Session enacted two statutes to overrule the holdings 
of the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Commonwealth v. JOCO 
Foundation:66 (1) that the Attorney General of Virginia had no 
authority to enforce public charities operating as non-profit cor-
porations; and (2) that exclusive jurisdiction for such enforcement 
was vested in the State Corporation Commission.67 After an open-
ing preamble that does no more than state present law,68 the first 
statute gives the Attorney General "the same authority to act on 
behalf of the public with respect to such assets [of a charitable 
corporation] as he has with respect to assets held by unincorpo-
rated charitable trusts and other charitable entities .... "69 The 
second statute grants unto the circuit courts "the same subject 
matter jurisdiction over matters pertaining to assets of charitable 
corporations, incorporated in or doing any business in Virginia, as 
the circuit courts have with respect to assets held by unincorpo-
rated charitable trusts and other charitable entities .... "70 
Ill. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
A. Missing Wills-Revoked or Lost 
The primary issue in Johnson v. Cauley71 was whether a will 
and two codicils that could not be found at testator's death "were 
in the possession of the drafting attorney and were inaccessible to 
the testator, giving rise to a presumption that the documents 
were lost, not revoked."72 In regard to the accessibility issue, ap-
66. 263 Va. 151, 558 S.E.2d 280 (2002). 
67. See discussion infra Part 111.F. 
68. "The assets of a charitable corporation incorporated in or doing any business in 
Virginia shall be deemed to be held in trust for the public for such purposes as are estab-
lished by the donor's intent as expressed in governing documents or by other applicable 
law." VA. CODE ANN.§ 2.2-507.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002). 
69. Id. 
70. Id.§ 17.1-513.01 (Cum. Supp. 2002). 
71. 262 Va. 40, 546 S.E.2d 681 (2001). 
72. Id. at 42, 546 S.E.2d at 683. A well-settled rule applicable to a missing will holds 
that it will be presumed to have been revoked if it was last in testator's possession and 
that it will be presumed to have been lost if it was last in the possession of another and 
not accessible to testator. Id. at 43, 546 S.E.2d at 683. 
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pellant contended that testamentary documents left in a drafting 
attorney's custody, "obviously are accessible to clients" and, ab-
sent testimony from the custodial attorney of loss, destruction, or 
delivery to testator, "a testator must be considered to have access 
to the documents."73 As the drafting attorney predeceased testa-
tor in this case, adoption of appellant's argument would necessar-
ily preclude a presumption that the testamentary documents 
were lost. 74 Although the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized 
that appellant's definition of access "reflects the legal right of the 
testator to retrieve her documents," it concluded that it "does not 
address the practical acts necessary to access testamentary 
documents for purposes of revoking them or reasserting physical 
control over them."75 After examining the disputed facts relating 
to these "practical acts," the court affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion that the testator did not have access to the will and codicils.76 
B. Joint Bank Account-Unilateral Addition of Additional Party 
The issue in Caine v. NationsBank77 was "whether a financial 
institution breached its statutory or contractual duties when it al-
lowed one party to a joint account to add unilaterally another 
party to the account."78 Almost ten years prior to his death, father 
("F") executed with daughter ("D") the requisite signature card at 
N ationsBank ("Bank") to open a joint checking account with sur-
vivorship. 79 In the month of his death, F and his wife ("W") exe-
cuted a new signature card that Bank recognized as sufficient to 
make W a party to F and D's joint account.80 D's action against 
Bank to recover the $100,181.13 in checks written on this account 
by W81 was decided against D on Bank's demurrer, with the trial 
court "holding that Code § 6.1-125.6 authorized the 'unilateral 
addition of a new owner to a multiple-party account."'82 Although 
73. Id. at 45, 546 S.E.2d at 684. 
74. Id. at 42, 546 S.E.2d at 683. 
75. Id. at 45, 546 S.E.2d at 684. 
76. Id. at 47, 546 S.E.2d at 685-86. 
77. 262 Va. 312, 551 S.E.2d 653 (2001). 
78. Id. at 315, 551 S.E.2d at 654. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. This total included a check for $75,000 that was "written, cashed, and deposited" 
to W's account on the day of F's death. Id. 
82. Id. 
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the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court correctly 
rejected D's argument that the provisions of Virginia Code section 
6.1-125.683 authorized one party to change the "form" of an ac-
count related only to survivorship rights, it also held that the 
trial court erred in ruling that this section "authorized" the ac-
count change in question.84 Referring to its recent decision in 
Jampol v. Farmer,85 the court reiterated that the language of Vir-
ginia Code section 6.1-125.6 "referring to a unilateral change in 
the account form was not the source of that authority [to alter the 
form of an account], but rather one means of exercising such au-
thority."86 However, the court stated that the governing contract87 
in this case provided in part that "[e]ach owner appoints all other 
owners as his or her agent to endorse, deposit, withdraw and 
conduct business for the account."88 In addition, the court quoted 
from Virginia Code section 6.1-125.15.1 that "each party to an ac-
count acts as 'agent in regard to the ownership interest of the 
other party."'89 Rejecting D's claim that the contractual language, 
to "conduct business for the account," related only to ministerial 
or transactional matters, the court responded that it was "suffi-
ciently broad so as to include the ability of one party to the ac-
count to act as the agent of the other parties [sic] to the account 
when adding a new party to the account."90 Accordingly, the court 
"conclude[d] that the bank did not breach its contract with [D] in 
83. This section of the Virginia Code provides that: 
the provisions of§ 6.1-125.5 as to rights of survivorship are determined by 
the form of the account at the death of a party. This form may be altered by 
written order given by a party to the financial institution to change the form 
of the account or to stop or vary payment under the terms of the account. The 
order or request must be signed by a party, received by the financial institu-
tion during the party's lifetime, and not countermanded by other written or-
der of the same party during his lifetime. 
VA. CODE.ANN.§ 6.1-125.6 (Repl. Vol. 1999). 
84. Caine, 262 Va. at 316--17, 551 S.E.2d at 655. 
85. 259 Va. 53, 524 S.E.2d 436 (2000). The court in Caine noted that "the trial court's 
holding was rendered less than one month after the decision in Jampol and the case was 
not discussed or cited by either the parties or the court." Caine, 262 Va. at 316 n.3, 551 
S.E.2d at 655, n.3. For a discussion of Jampol, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of 
Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1084-85 (2000). 
86. Caine, 262 Va. at 317, 551 S.E.2d at 655. 
87. "The contract between the bank and the parties to the joint account in this case 
consists of the Retail Signature Card and the Rules and Regulations Governing Retail Ac-
counts." Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 318, 551 S.E.2d at 656 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.15:1 (Repl. Vol. 
1999)). 
90. Id. at 319, 551 S.E.2d at 656. 
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recognizing [W] as a party to the joint account based on the signa-
ture card executed by [F] ."91 
Although not disagreeing with the outcome in this case, one 
wonders why it was decided on the basis of F serving as D's 
agent. The contract provision the court relied upon stated that 
"each owner appoints .... "92 But, although D was a "party"93 to 
the account, she was clearly not an "owner" under Virginia law94 
and may not have been an "owner" under the referenced portion 
of the contract between D, F, and Bank.95 Moreover, even if F was 
authorized to act as D's agent, there is nothing in the opinion to 
indicate that F verbally claimed to be acting as D's agent when F 
executed the new signature card, and the signature card itself 
contains nothing to indicate such an intent.96 It is respectfully 
submitted that, in the absence of a statute or contract provision 
clearly governing this case, the court could have simply and more 
directly concluded that, as F was the undisputed sole owner of 
this account, he did not require D's consent to add another party 
thereto.97 Such an analysis would also: (1) promote the cause of 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 317, 551 S.E.2d at 655 (emphasis added). 
93. The term "party" is defined as meaning "a person who, by the terms of the ac-
count, has a present right, subject to request, to payment from a multiple-party account." 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 6.1-125.1(7) (Rep!. Vol. 1999). 
94. Although it is not clear from the court's opinion, it is an "uncontested" fact in the 
trial court's opinion letter, Opinion Letter of the Honorable F. Bruce Bach at 54, Caine 
(No. 002615), and admitted in the briefs of appellant (Brief of Appellant at 9, Caine (No. 
002615)), and appellee (Briefof Appellee at 15, Caine (No. 002615)) that F made all of the 
contributions to this account, and Virginia Code section 6.1-125.3(A) states that "[a] joint 
account belongs, during the lifetimes of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net 
contributions by each to the sums on deposit .... " VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.3(A) (Rep!. 
Vol. 1999) (The remainder of this subsection provides: "Except that a joint account be-
tween persons married to each other shall belong to them equally, and unless, in either 
case, there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent."). Therefore, as D made 
no contributions to the account, she had no ownership interest therein. 
95. An examination of the contract between the parties shows the Retail Signature 
Card referring to the participants (to use a neutral term) as "customers" and the Rules 
and Regulations Governing Retail Accounts referring to "owners" or "persons" or "deposi-
tors" without defining any of these terms. See Retail Signature Card at 16, 19, Caine (No. 
002615); Rules and Regulations Governing Joint Accounts at 7, Caine (No. 002615). The 
standard rule for construing ambiguities in a contract of adhesion calls for them to be re-
solved against the one who prepared the contract. 
96. See Retail Signature Card at 19, Caine (No. 002615). 
97. The Official Comment to pre-1989 Uniform Probate Code section 6-103, which is 
the source of Virginia Code section 6.1-125.3, provides general support for the suggested 
conclusion as follows: 
The theory of these sections is that the basic relationship of the parties is 
that of individual ownership of values attributable to their respective depos-
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uniformity as similar issues arise in other financial institutions; 
and (2) eliminate the need to peruse each institution's otherwise 
unique account cards and regulations which, experience suggests, 
are seldom read and less often understood by their customers 
C. Holographic Will-Sufficiency of Signature 
In Kidd v. Gunter,98 decedent left a bound journal containing 
an admitted testamentary writing which, though entirely in de-
cedent's hand, did not have a signature at its end.99 However, 
proponents of the writing argued that the decedent's writing of 
this name in a pre-printed box on the inside cover of her journal 
satisfied the signature requirement of Virginia Code section 
64.1-49.100 Although this section does not require a will to be 
signed at the end, and a testator's name written in a document's 
title101 or opening sentence102 has been found sufficient there-
under, '"it must appear unequivocally from the face of the writing' 
that the person's name therein is intended as a signature."103 Fol-
lowing an examination of the undisputed facts in this case, the 
court concluded that "[n]o affirmative evidence on the face of the 
journal demonstrates that [decedent] intended her signature in 
that box to be her signature to the will," and thus it affirmed the 
trial court's denial of probate.104 
its and withdrawals; the right of survivorship which attaches unless negated 
by the form of the account really is a right to the values theretofore owned by 
another which the survivor receives for the first time at the death of the 
owner. That is to say, the account operates as a valid disposition at death 
rather than as a present joint tenancy. 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 6-103 cmt. (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 464 (1998). Virginia Code sec-
tion 6.1-125.3 was enacted in 1979 as a part of Virginia's adoption of the pre-1989 Uniform 
Probate Code's provisions governing multiple party accounts in financial institutions. S.B. 
645, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1979) (enacted as Act of Mar. 26, 1979, ch. 407, 1979 
Va. Acts 597) (codified at VA. CODE ANN.§§ 6.1-125.1 to -125.16 (Repl. Vol. 1999)). 
98. 262 Va. 442, 551 S.E.2d 646 (2001). 
99. Id. at 444, 551 S.E.2d at 647. 
100. Id. In relevant part, Virginia Code section 64.1-49 requires a will to be "signed by 
the testator ... in such manner as to make it manifest that the name is intended as a sig-
nature .... " VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-49 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
101. See Hall v. Brigstocke, 190 Va. 459, 466, 58 S.E.2d 529, 533 (1950). 
102. See Slate v. Titmus, 238 Va. 557, 561, 385 S.E.2d 590, 592 (1989). 
103. Kidd, 262 Va. at 445, 551 S.E.2d at 648 (quoting Slate, 238 Va. at 560, 385 S.E.2d 
at 591). 
104. Id. at 448, 551 S.E.2d at 649. Ironically, the first sentence decedent wrote in her 
journal was "[t]his journal has been set up to eliminate problems for my family at the time 
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D. Disinterment-Reburial-Standing of Former Spouse 
The issue in Grisso u. Nolen 105 was whether the trial court 
erred in holding that a divorced man had standing to petition for 
the "disinterment and reburial of his former wife's body."106 Hus-
band ("H") and wife ("W'') were divorced after thirty-eight years of 
marriage, but they cohabited intermittently until W's death in-
testate six years later. 107 As W had made no final arrangements of 
her own, "the proper determination of the place of her burial 
rested with her personal representative, her surviving spouse, or 
her next of kin."108 D, who was H and W's daughter and W's next 
of kin, made the arrangements for W's interment.109 Six months 
thereafter H brought his petition to assert W's alleged expressed 
wish regarding the disposition of her body, which the trial court 
ruled he had standing to bring because, although he was "legally 
a stranger to [W], in fact he is not."110 On appeal, H further ar-
gued "he had standing because the suit was not adversarial in na-
ture, but was brought 'in rem' in order to permit the court to de-
termine and give effect to [W's] wish regarding her final resting 
place."111 The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this "novel 
premise" and held that, as their divorce made H and W legal 
strangers, H "had no cognizable interest in the place of her burial 
and, thus, no standing to seek the disinterment of her body for 
reburial."112 
of my death." Id. at 444, 552 S.E.2d at 647. 
105. 262 Va. 688, 554 S.E.2d 91 (2001). For further discussion of this case see John V. 
Cogbill, III & D. Brennan Keene, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Real Estate and Land 
Use Law, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 277 (2002). 
106. Grisso, 262 Va. at 693, 554 S.E.2d at 94. 
107. Id. at 695, 554 S.E.2d at 95. 
108. Id. (citing Goldman v. Mollen, 168 Va. 345, 354, 191 S.E. 627, 631 (1937)). This 
quotation was also before the U.S. District Court in Mazur v. Woodson, 191 F. Supp. 2d 
676 (E.D. Va. 2002), discussed infra Part IV.B. 
109. The court in Grisso stated that "[a]lthough the record is not clear on this point, it 
would appear that [D) also qualified as the personal representative of her mother's estate. 
Certainly, as next of kin and sole heir, she would have been the preferred person to so 
qualify." Id. at 694 n.2, 554 S.E.2d at 94 n.2. 
110. Id. at 691, 554 S.E.2d at 93. 
111. Id. at 694, 554 S.E.2d at 95. 
112. Id. at 694-95, 554 S.E.2d at 95. 
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E. Oral Waiver-Augmented Estate-Spousal Allowances 
The issue in Flanary v. Milton113 was the validity of an oral, 
post-marital property agreement. 114 On the day preceding H's 
death, and while his deposition was being taken in the divorce 
proceeding between H and W, "an oral agreement between the 
parties was recited into the record by the parties' attorneys," the 
provisions of which W agreed would constitute '"a full and final 
settlement of all rights accrued by virtue of this marriage."'115 
When W subsequently petitioned for spousal allowances and an 
elective share in H's augmented estate, the trial court ruled "that 
the oral agreement was valid and effectively released" these 
rights.116 Post-marital contracts are governed by Virginia Code 
section 20-155, which provides that they are "subject to the same 
conditions, as provided in §§ 20-147 through 20-154 for agree-
ments between prospective spouses,"117 and Virginia Code sec-
tion 20-149 requires a pre-marital agreement to be in writing and 
signed by the parties.118 The executor of H's estate claimed ex-
emption from these requirements, relying on Richardson v. 
Richardson, 119 in which the Virginia Court of Appeals held that 
"'compromises and settlement agreements to pending litigation 
which incidentally include issues of property and spousal support' 
are not within the purview of [Virginia] Code § 20-155 and, thus, 
do not need to comply with the requirement that such agreements 
be in writing."120 However, the supreme court responded that 
"[s]tatutes must be read according to their plain meaning, giving 
effect to the language that the legislature chose to use ... [and 
that] nothing in the language of [Virginia] Code § 20-155 exempts 
from its application a property ... agreement made in contempla-
tion of resolving a pending divorce action."121 Accordingly, the 
113. 263 Va. 20, 556 S.E.2d 767 (2002). For further discussion of this case, see Eliza-
beth P. Coughter & Ronald R. Tweel, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Family Law, 37 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 155, 182-83 (2002). 
114. Flanary, 263 Va. at 21, 556 S.E.2d at 768. 
115. Id. at 21-22, 556 S.E.2d at 768. 
116. Id. at 22, 556 S.E.2d at 768. 
117. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-155 (Repl. Vol. 2000). 
118. See id.§ 20-149 (Repl. Vol. 2000). 
119. 10 Va. App. 391, 392 S.E.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1990). 
120. Flanary, 263 Va. at 23, 556 S.E.2d at 768 (quoting Richardson, 10 Va. App. at 398, 
392 S.E.2d at 691). 
121. Id. at 23, 556 S.E.2d at 768-69. Note, however, that the court has held that the 
language of Virginia Code section 20-155 does not prevent married persons from entering 
378 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:357 
court "reject[ed] the Executor's arguments and the rationale and 
holding of Richardson upon which he relies," and reversed the 
trial court's decision.122 
F. Charitable Corporations-Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
In Commonwealth v. JOCO Foundation, 123 a divided Supreme 
Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court's holding that exclusive 
jurisdiction for the regulation of public charities operating as non-
profit corporations was vested in the State Corporation Commis-
sion.124 This four-to-three decision was overruled, prospectively, 
by the 2002 Session of the General Assembly.125 
G. P.O.D. T-Bills and CD-Ownership-Burden of Proof-
Federal Preemption 
The issues before the court in Beeton u. Beeton, 126 involved the 
ownership of: (1) a certificate of deposit ("CD") in a local bank, 
worth approximately $200,000, on which Decedent ("D") had 
listed Son ("S") as the payable on death ("P.O.D.") beneficiary and 
which S had re-issued as a joint certificate with survivorship 
prior to D's death; and (2) two U.S. Treasury Bills, in the amount 
of $1,000,000 and $250,000, on which S was the P.O.D. benefici-
ary at D's death. 127 In regard to the $200,000 CD, the Supreme 
Court of Virginia agreed with plaintiffs that the re-issued certifi-
cate was void because only a "party" could make such a change 
and S, as a P.O.D. beneficiary, was not a party during D's life-
time.128 However, the court rejected plaintiffs' contention that S's 
into a valid oral contract to make a will. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-155 (Rep!. Vol. 2000); Black 
v. Edwards, 248 Va. 90, 94, 445 S.E.2d 107, 110 (1994). For a discussion of Black, see J. 
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 29 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1175, 1191-94 (1995). Neither the opinion nor the briefs of the parties make any 
mention of Black. 
122. Flanary, 263 Va. at 23, 556 S.E.2d at 769. 
123. 263 Va. 151, 558 S.E.2d 280 (2002). 
124. Id. at 160, 558 S.E.2d at 284. 
125. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 17.1-513.01 (Cum. Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN.§ 2.2-507.1 
(Cum. Supp. 2002). This legislation is noted supra Part H.K. 
126. 263 Va. 329, 559 S.E.2d 663 (2002). 
127. Id. at 334-35, 559 S.E.2d at 666. 
128. Id. at 337, 559 S.E.2d at 668. Chapter 2.1 of Title 6.1, entitled "Multiple Party Ac-
counts," provides that: (1) a CD is an account; (2) the form of an account may be altered by 
a party; and (3) "a P.O.D. payee ... is a party only after the account becomes payable to 
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re-issuance actions rendered the original CD invalid and that the 
proceeds of this account should therefore be paid to D's estate. In-
stead, the court concluded that, as S's re-issuance actions were 
ineffectual, the original CD, "which designated [S] as the P.O.D. 
beneficiary, remained in effect at [D's] death."129 
D's account with the U.S. Treasury containing the two P.0.D. 
T-bills in issue also included a third T-bill, in the amount of 
$200,000, on which S was also the P.O.D. beneficiary; and, ac-
cording to S, all three of these P.O.D. designations were made by 
him at D's direction.130 S testified that, while assisting D to renew 
other T-bills, they "ran across a bill that did not have a P.O.D. on 
it. She told [him] that she would like to place a P.O.D. on it," and 
asked him to obtain the necessary form. 131 S further testified that 
he completed this form at D's direction, thinking that the account 
number she furnished him related only to the $200,000 T-bill, 
and not discovering the existence of the $1,000,000 and $250,000 
T-bills in the account until after D's death. 132 The chancellor con-
cluded that the evidence failed to disclose any intent on D's part 
to make S the P.O.D. beneficiary of the $1,000,000 and $250,000 
T-bills and thus awarded them to D's estate.133 The court began 
him by reason of his surviving the original payee .... " VA. CODE ANN.§§ 6.1-125.1(1), (7), 
-125.6 (Repl. Vol. 1999). 
129. Beeton, 263 Va. at 337, 559 S.E.2d at 668. 
130. Id. at 333, 559 S.E.2d at 665. The chancellor found that D was competent at the 
time of the changes and that the changes were not the result of S's fraud or undue influ-
ence. Id. at 334, 559 S.E.2d at 666. No appeal was taken from this portion of the chancel-
lor's opinion. 
131. Id. at 333, 559 S.E.2d at 665. 
132. Id. at 333, 559 S.E.2d at 665-66. When questioned further about his conversation 
with D concerning the addition of a P.O.D. designation, S testified: 
"At that time she indicated that she wanted to put a P.0.D. on the account." 
However, when questioned why D wanted to make the P.O.D designation, S 
also stated, "From her conversation she just indicated to me considering the 
way things are going I would like to place a P.O.D. on that bill." 
S also testified that when D instructed him to list himself as the P.0.D. bene-
ficiary on the Transaction Request Form, she commented to S, 'That's a lot of 
responsibility." 
Id. at 333, 559 S.E.2d 665-66. 
133. Id. at 334, 559 S.E.2d at 666. The chancellor also based his opinion on the eviden-
tiary rule found in Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 462, 114 S.E. 652, 656 (1922), holding 
that S "was bound by his testimony that before his mother's death, he thought that her 
intent was to have the added P.0.D. designation apply only to the $200,000 Treasury Bill." 
Beeton, 263 Va. at 334, 559 S.E.2d at 666. The court held that the chancellor erred in his 
application of the Massie doctrine, which "is limited to sworn statements of fact within a 
litigant's own personal knowledge and ... does not apply to a litigant's statement of opin-
ion." Id. at 336-37, 559 S.E.2d at 667. 
380 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:357 
its resolution of the intent issue by stating that these T-bills were 
contained in a "Treasury Direct" account opened by D with the 
United States Department of the Treasury and that it would treat 
"this particular account as an 'account' within the meaning of 
[Virginia] Code § 6.1-125.1(1)" under the law of this case as pre-
sented by the parties.134 The court then noted that although Vir-
ginia Code section 6.1-125.5, containing the rules of survivorship 
in multiple party accounts, contains a clear and convincing evi-
dence standard in some cases, it has no provision applicable to 
the present situation.135 Taking the expressed as a guide for the 
unexpressed, the court decided that "[i]n the absence of a statu-
tory directive to the contrary, ... the burden of proof required to 
overcome the intent expressed by the form of a P.O.D. account 
having a sole original payee is also that of clear and convincing 
evidence."136 An examination of the evidence led the court to con-
clude that "as a matter of law, the executors failed to meet this 
evidentiary burden."137 
Although it is believed that the correct conclusion was reached 
in this case, it appears that the case should have been presented 
134. Id. at 335, 559 S.E.2d 667. The opinion contains a footnote at this point, in which 
the court states that: 
The parties presented this case at trial and on appeal under the statutory 
framework of Title 6.1 of the Code, and neither the parties nor the trial court 
considered provisions of federal law relating to the ownership of a Treasury 
Direct account or of securities held in such an account. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. 
§ 357.22(c) (2001). Therefore, the provisions of Title 6.1 have become the law 
of the case. 
Id. at 335 n.1, 559 S.E.2d at 667 n.l. 
The parties erred on this point. The cited code section defines an account as "a contract 
of deposit of funds between a depositor and a financial institution .... " VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 6.1-125.1(1) (Rep!. Vol. 1999) (emphasis added). And this same section defines a financial 
institution as "any organization authorized to do business under state or federal laws re-
lating to financial institutions, including, without limitation, banks and trust companies, 
savings banks, building and loan associations, savings and loan companies or associations, 
and credit unions." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.1(3). The United States Department of the 
Treasury does not fit within the language or intent of this definition of financial institu-
tion. This conclusion is reinforced by reference to Virginia Code section 6.1-125.2, which 
provides in part that "[t]he provisions of§§ 6.1-125.9 through 6.1-125.14 govern the liabil-
ity of financial institutions who make payments pursuant thereto, and their set-off rights." 
Id. § 6.1-125.2 (Rep!. Vol. 1999). Clearly, the Virginia General Assembly cannot "govern 
the liability ... [and] set-off rights" of the United States Department of the Treasury. Nor 
can it require the Treasury Department to participate in the garnishment process, as is 
required of a financial institution. Id§ 6.l-125.3(D). 
135. Beeton, 263 Va. at 335-36, 559 S.E.2d at 667. 
136. Id. at 336, 559 S.E.2d at 667. 
137. Id. 
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to the court under federal law138 instead of the law of the Com-
monwealth.139 The United States Department of the Treasury has 
adopted regulations dealing with securities held in "Treasury Di-
rect,"140 which provide in part that "[r]egistration of a security 
conclusively establishes ownership."141 An appendix to these 
regulations explains that: 
The reason for establishing the rights of ownership for securities 
held in TREASURY DIRECT is that it will give investors the assur-
ance that the forms of registration they select will establish conclu-
sively the rights to their book-entry securities. It will also serve to 
eliminate some of the uncertainties, as well as possible conflicts, be-
tween the varying laws of the several States. 
A Federal rule of ownership is being adopted by the Treasury for 
TREASURY DIRECT securities .... It will have the effect of over-
riding inconsistent State laws.142 
One of the registration forms permitted by the federal regula-
tions is "Beneficiary. In the name of one individual followed by 
the words 'Payable on death to' (or 'P.O.D.') another individual,'' 
the rules of which correspond to Virginia law governing P.O.D. 
accounts, with one exception,143 and the present case involved this 
exception. Whereas Virginia law, as fleshed out by the court, 
would allow the form of a P.O.D. account having a sole original 
138. The court noted that no reference to federal authority is made in the brief of either 
party concerning the ownership issue. Id. at 335 n.1, 559 S.E.2d at 667 n.l; see also VA. 
CODE ANN. § 20-149 (Repl. Vol. 2000). However, S's brief does refer to D's compliance with 
federal law in the execution of the transaction request form. Brief of Appellant at 15-16, 
Beeton (No. 011225). 
139. It has already been noted in footnote 128, supra, that the account in this case was 
not an "account" within the definition of that term contained in Virginia's Multiple Party 
Account laws. VA. CODE ANN.§ 6.1-125.1(1). 
140. Treasury Direct Book-Entry Securities System (TREASURY DIRECT), 31 C.F.R. 
§§ 357.20 to -.32 (2001). 
141. 31 C.F.R. § 357.21(a)(l). The omitted portion of this sentence creates an exception 
for "the case of partnership nominees." Id. 
142. 31 C.F.R. § 357 App. A (citing Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962)). In Free, the 
United States Supreme Court answered affirmatively the question of "whether the Treas-
ury Regulations creating a right of survivorship in United States Savings Bonds pre-empt 
any inconsistent Texas community property law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, Arti-
cle VI, Clause 2, of the Constitution." 369 U.S. at 664. 
143. 31 C.F.R. § 357.21(b)(2)(iii). 
Id. 
Registration in this form shall create ownership rights in the beneficiary only 
if the beneficiary survives the owner. During an owner's lifetime, a transac-
tion request may be executed by the owner without the consent of the benefi-
ciary. If the beneficiary dies before the owner, the security will be deemed to 
be registered in the owner's name alone. 
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payee to be contradicted by clear and convincing evidence, federal 
law holds that the form of a P.O.D. T-bill account is conclusive.144 
H. Right of First Refusal-Rule Against Perpetuities 
One of the issues before the Supreme Court of Virginia in Fire-
baugh v. Whitehead145 was whether a certain right of first refusal 
to purchase real estate violated the rule against perpetuities.146 
The court correctly stated that such a right "is void ab initio if, at 
its creation, there is a possibility the right might not be exercised 
until after the expiration of the time period fixed by the rule, 
which is measured by a life or lives in being plus 21 years and 10 
months."147 Then, after noting that the right before it "was spe-
cifically granted to 'Charles Whitehead and Martha A White-
head, or the survivor,"' the court concluded that "[t]he relevant 
lives in being at the time of the grant were [Grantor] and the 
Whiteheads, and the right vested at the time of the execution of 
the agreement."148 The court was correct in concluding that the 
right of first refusal did not violate the rule against perpetuities, 
but its reasoning was incorrect. The time of vesting of the right of 
first refusal is irrelevant. The true issue, as previously noted by 
the court, is whether it might be exercised beyond the period per-
mitted by the rule. 149 The correct analysis is that, as the right in 
this case was personal to the Whiteheads, 150 it could not be exer-
cised any later than the lifetime of the survivor of them. Thus, as 
they were both lives in being, it is clear that the right of first re-
fusal could not be exercised beyond the perpetuity period. 
144. 31 C.F.R. § 357.21(a)(l); see also Estate of Scheiner, 535 N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y. Sur. 
Ct. 1988) (focusing on survivorship rights in an joint tenancy). Scheiner appears to be the 
only case to have considered the supremacy of the Treasury Direct regulations. The court 
concluded that "[t]he Federal regulations known as Treasury Direct preempted any exist-
ing inconsistent State law by mandating that these securities should pass as registered." 
Id. at 921. 
145. 263 Va. 398, 559 S.E.2d 611 (2002). 
146. Id. at 404, 559 S.E.2d 615. See Cogbill & Keene, supra note 105, at 278-80, for a 
discussion of other issues in this case. 
147. Firebaugh, 263 Va. at 404, 559 S.E.2d at 615-16. 
148. Id. at 405, 559 S.E.2d at 616. 
149. See supra text accompanying note 147. 
150. This is not expressly stated in the opinion, but it seems to be fairly implied 
thereby, and it also appears to be an accurate characterization of the Whiteheads' right. 
2002) WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
I. Augmented Estate and Spousal Allowances-Pre-Nuptial 
Waiver 
383 
The issue in Pysell v. Keck151 was whether a surviving wife's 
claim to family allowance, exempt articles allowance, and an elec-
tive share in her deceased husband's estate was barred by their 
pre-nuptial contract.152 Applying the standard rules applicable to 
the interpretation of contracts, a majority of the Supreme Court 
of Virginia concluded that "[n]owhere in these three paragraphs 
or elsewhere in the agreement do we find a reference to either 
party's rights in the property of the estate of the other."153 Accord-
ingly, the court held that "the trial court erred in entering sum-
mary judgment for the executor on this issue," and remanded the 
case for further proceedings in the trial court.154 The two dissent-
ing justices believed that "[t]he majority has focused entirely on 
the draftsmanship of the document rather than the intent of the 
parties."155 
J. Constructive Trust-Accounting 
In Tauber v. Commonwealth, 156 the Supreme Court of Virginia 
"consider[ed] issues related to an accounting of the assets of a de-
funct charitable corporation."157 This case is a sequel to a 1998 
151. 263 Va. 457, 559 S.E.2d 677 (2002). 
152. The portions of this agreement before the court were: 
2. That it is the intention of the parties that each of them shall continue to 
own as his or her separate property, all of the real, personal or mixed prop-
erty which they individually own as of this date. 
3. That they may hereafter individually acquire additional property of a simi-
lar nature, and it is the intention of the parties hereto that said property 
shall also be the individual property of the person acquiring the same. 
6 .... [It is] the intention and desire of the parties that their respective rights 
to each other's property acquired by operation of law shall be solely deter-
mined and fixed by this agreement. 
Id. at 459, 559 S.E.2d at 678 (alteration in original). 
153. Id. at 460, 559 S.E.2d at 679. 
154. Id. at 461, 559 S.E.2d at 679. 
155. Id. at 463, 559 S.E.2d at 680. The essence of the dissent's rationale is that the 
agreement expressly provided for the parties lifetime rights in paragraphs two and three 
and, "[e]xcluding those rights, the remaining rights that could be 'acquired by operation of 
law' are those that accrue to a surviving spouse." Id. at 464, 559 S.E.2d at 681. 
156. 263 Va. 520, 562 S.E.2d 118 (2002) [hereinafter Tauber II]. 
157. Id. at 525, 562 S.E.2d at 120. 
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case of the same name158 wherein the court "affirmed the chancel-
lor's judgement imposing a constructive trust on the assets of the 
[same] defunct charitable corporation."159 Tauber II is a lengthy, 
fact-specific opinion that applies established rules of law to 
unique facts160 prior to affirming in part with final judgment, re-
versing in part, modifying and final judgment as modified, and 
remanding.161 
IV. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CASE 
A. Trust Income Taxation-Deduction for Investment Advice-2% 
Rule 
Investment advisory fees are treated as a "miscellaneous item-
ized deduction" for federal income tax purposes.162 The general 
rule of I.R.C. section 67 limits the deductibility of such costs to 
the amount they exceed 2% of a taxpayer's adjusted gross in-
come-the "two percent rule."163 However, the 2% rule is not ap-
plied to estates and trusts regarding costs "which would not have 
been incurred if the property were not held in such trust or es-
tate ."164 In Scott v. United States, 165 the trust and its income bene-
ficiaries claimed that the 2% rule should not be applied to the fees 
paid to the trust's financial advisor because the responsibilities 
imposed upon a trustee by Virginia's "prudent investor" rule cre-
ate a fiduciary duty on the trustee's part to seek the assistance of 
a financial advisor, while individuals investing their own funds 
clearly have no such obligation.166 This argument has been ac-
cepted by the Sixth Circuit167 and rejected by the Federal Cir-
158. Tauber v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 445, 499 S.E.2d 839 (1998) [hereinafter Tauber 
I]. 
159. Tauber II, 263 Va. at 525, 562 S.E.2d at 120. 
160. Although the case presented issues involving constructive trusts, commingling, 
and allowance of attorney fees and costs that serve to lighten the tedium expected in an 
accounting case, these issues are not discussed herein because they are all resolved by the 
application of well-settled rules oflaw. 
161. Tauber II, 263 Va. at 548, 562 S.E.2d at 133. 
162. 26 U.S.C. § 67(a) (2000). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. § 67(e)(l). 
165. 186 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
166. See id. at 666. 
167. O'Neil v. Comm'r, 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993). 
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cuit. 168 However, the district court decided it was not necessary to 
follow either of these two lines of authority because, as Virginia 
fiduciaries may elect to invest pursuant . to Virginia's "legal 
list,"169 which immunizes them from any charge that they in-
vested imprudently, 170 "a trustee in Virginia is not required to 
consult a financial advisor to fulfill his statutory obligations."171 
Therefore, according to the court, "[a] trust's 'need' to incur the 
costs of a financial advisor is no different than the 'need' of an in-
dividual," and thus a trust is restricted to the same deduction as 
an individual, i.e., one subject to the 2% rule.172 
B. Burial-Mishandling of Corpse-Next-of-Kin 
In Mazur v. Woodson,173 a widower and his adult children ("P") 
sought to recover damages for "intentional and negligent mishan-
dling of a corpse under Virginia common law" from the funeral 
home ("F") that buried his wife and their mother ("D"), from F's 
employee ("E") who handled D's funeral service, and from D's 
brother ("B"), who had been appointed guardian of D's person and 
property in 1994, and who made the arrangements for D's burial 
in Virginia following D's death on July 1, 2001.174 Although P's 
state court petition for D's disinterment and reburial in New Jer-
sey was granted on August 10, 2001 pursuant to a consent decree 
in which B joined, P alleged in the present case that no notice was 
given of D's original burial and that D's advanced decomposition 
168. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
169. Virginia's "legal list" is found in Virginia Code section 26-40.01, which identifies a 
number of investments under three broad headings: (1) "Obligations of the Common-
wealth, its agencies and political subdivisions"; (2) "Obligations of the United States"; and 
(3) "Savings accounts, time deposits or certificates of deposit" and provides that fiduciaries 
whose investments are made within these enumerations "shall be conclusively presumed 
to have been prudent in investing the funds held by them in a fiduciary capacity." VA. 
CODE ANN. § 26-40.0l(B) (Repl. Vol. 2001). 
170. The court stated that "[a)s unfair as it may prove to be to the beneficiaries, a trus-
tee in Virginia may arbitrarily decide to invest one hundred percent of the assets of a trust 
in United States Savings Bonds and he will be deemed to have met the 'prudent investor' 
standard." Scott, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 668. 
171. Id. The court dismissed plaintiffs' further argument that "a fiduciary in Virginia 
owes a duty of'impartiality' over and above the 'prudent investor' rule" that would require 
consultation with a financial advisor, finding that the former is incorporated into the lat-
ter. Id. 
172. Id. at 669. 
173. 191 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
174. Id. at677-78. 
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at disinterment prevented P from holding "a proper funeral ser-
vice" for D.175 Notwithstanding P's assertion of a common law 
claim against F and E, the court concluded that Virginia Code 
section 54.l-2807(B) was controlling, that it permitted F and E to 
bury D's body upon the authorization of "any"176 of D's next of kin, 
and thus that B was one of D's "next of kin,"177 it granted F's and 
E's motions to dismiss.178 
In connection with P's claim against B, the court noted that in 
Virginia "'the right to bury and preserve the remains is recog-
nized and protected as a quasi-property right,"' and that '"an ac-
tion ex delicto will lie against a wrongdoer for the wrongful inva-
sion of a near-relative's rights with respect to a dead body ... or 
for a breach of duty in respect to it.'"179 However the court con-
cluded that such a cause of action is a right in favor of a dece-
dent's next of kin against a third party, that all of a decedent's 
next of kin have equal rights and standing, and that, as B was 
one of D's next of kin, "he is not subject to suit from other mem-
bers of that class for withholding the body from them.''180 It ap-
pears that the court may have erred at this point. The chapter of 
the Virginia Code within which the court's definition of "next of 
175. Id. at 678. 
176. The statute provides that: 
Funeral service establishments shall not accept a dead human body from any 
public officer except a medical examiner, or from any public or private facility 
or person having a professional relationship with the decedent without hav-
ing first inquired about the desires of the next of kin and the persons liable 
for the funeral expenses of the decedent. The authority and directions of any 
next of kin shall govern the disposal of the body. 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 54.l-2807(B) (Rep!. Vol. 1999) (emphasis added). 
177. Chapter 28 of Title 54.1 is titled "Funeral Services." §§ 54.1-2800 to -2825 (Rep!. 
Vol. 2002.) The "Definitions" section provides in part that: 
As used in this Chapter, unless the context requires a different meaning, ... 
"Next of kin" means any of the following persons, regardless of the relation-
ship to the decedent: any person designated to make arrangements for the 
disposition of the decedent's remains upon his death pursuant to§ 54.1-2825, 
the legal spouse, child over eighteen years of age, custodial parent, noncusto-
dial parent, siblings over the age of eighteen years of age, guardian of minor 
child, guardian of minor siblings, maternal grandparents, paternal grandpar-
ents, maternal siblings over eighteen years of age and paternal siblings over 
eighteen years of age, or any other relative in the descending order of blood 
relationship. 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 54.1-2800 (Rep!. Vol. 2002). 
178. Mazur, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 681. 
179. Id. (quoting Sanford v. Ware, 191 Va. 43, 48, 60 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1950)). 
180. Id. at 682. 
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kin" is found is entitled "Funeral Services."181 An examination of 
the code sections contained therein suggests that this chapter is 
intended to deal solely with the regulation of the funeral indus-
try182 and that its provisions are not meant to govern controver-
sies between a decedent's relatives or between relatives and third 
parties.183 This analysis is not meant· to suggest that P should 
necessarily recover any damages from B, only that B is not im-
mune to a claim brought by P simply because B was D's brother, 
and that, therefore, P's claim should not have been dismissed. 
P's alternative argument against B was based upon the well-
known dicta in Goldman u. Mallen, 184 that a "decedent's place of 
burial rests with his personal representatives, 185 his widow or his 
next of kin. 186 Ordinarily personal representatives are not ap-
/ 
181. VA. CODE.ANN.§ 54.1-2800 (Repl. Vol. 2002). 
182. Id. Chapter 28, "Funeral Services," is divided into five articles: (1) "Board of Fu-
neral Directors and Embalmers"; (2) "Licensure of Funeral Establishments"; (3) "Licen-
sure of the Practice of Funeral Services, Funeral Directors and Embalmers"; (4) "Registra-
tion of Surface Transportation and Removal Services"; and (5) "Preneed Funeral 
Contracts." Id. §§ 54.1-2800 to -2825. Virginia Code section 54.1-2807, found in Article (1), 
is entitled "Other prohibited activities," and the apparent purpose of its subsection B, 
upon which the court correctly relied in dismissing P's claim against F and E, is to prohibit 
a funeral service establishment from acting without the consent of some family member-
and not to state the rights of the family members as between themselves. 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 54.1-2807(B) (Repl. Vol. 2002). 
183. If each member of the class composed of the "next of kin," as broadly defined by 
Virginia Code section 54.1-2800, has coequal rights, one wonders how all of the class 
members would be identified and how a recovery against a third-party wrongdoer would 
be apportioned among them. 
184. 168 Va. 345, 191 S.E. 627 (1937). 
185. One who is nominated as executor in a decedent's will has no authority prior to 
qualification, "except that he may provide for the burial of the testator, pay reasonable fu-
neral expenses and preserve the estate from waste." VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-136 (Repl. Vol. 
1995). 
186. It is clear that Goldman, a 1937 case, was not referring to the same definition of 
"next of kin" as was the court in the present case, because the latter's definition was not 
added to the Code until 1991. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2800 (Repl. Vol. 2002). It is also 
clear that Colman was using "next of kin" in a wills, trusts, and estates sense and, al-
though one can argue that a different meaning was intended by the Goldman Court in 
1937, the most recent definitional statement by the Supreme Court of Virginia holds that 
"next of kin" is "a nontechnical term whose commonly accepted meaning is 'nearest in 
blood."' Elmore v. Va. Nat'l Bank, 232 Va. 310, 314, 350 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1986). Notwith-
standing Elmore's 1986 reference to "nearest in blood," one would think that adopted per-
sons are now presumptively included within one's "next of kin" as a result of the 1987 
amendments to Virginia Code section 64.1-71.1, "construction of generic terms" (in wills 
and trusts), and the 1987 enactment of Virginia Code section 55-49.1, "construction of ge-
neric terms" (in deeds). VA. CODE.ANN.§ 55-49.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995). 
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pointed until later and so this choice usually is made by the fam-
ily. As between them, the wishes of the widow should control."187 
Noting that Goldman was an equitable action seeking disin-
terment, the court stated that in such a case "a court may have to 
consider the wishes of the decedent's widow above those of the 
other members of the decedent's 'next of kin."'188 However, the 
court concluded that "any equitable rights [D's widower] may 
have had in this matter have been resolved" in the earlier state 
court proceeding which terminated with a consent decree author-
izing D's disinterment, and therefore the court granted B's motion 
to dismiss. 189 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons recited herein, it is respectfully submitted that 
the 2003 Session should: (1) make clarifying amendments to the 
2002 legislation dealing with access to powers of attorney in safe-
deposit boxes, 190 and payment of taxes by fiduciaries; 191 (2) enact 
legislation dealing with delivery of powers of attorney and with 
access to living wills in safe-deposit boxes192 and providing a ge-
neric exception to the seven-year presumption of death rule;193 (3) 
repeal the misbegotten incorporation by reference statute;194 and 
(4) consider legislation clarifying the rights and priorities of fam-
ily members regarding the burial of their dead. 195 
187. Goldman, 168 Va. at 354, 191 S.E. at 631. The Goldman dicta was also before the 
Supreme Court of Virginia in Grisso v. Nolan, 262 Va. 688, 554 S.E.2d 91 (2002), discussed 
supra Part 111.D. 
188. Mazur, 191 F. Supp. 2d 676, 683 (E.D. Va. 2002). It is clear that the court is refer-
ring to "next of kin" here as it is broadly defined for purposes of Chapter 28 of Title 54.1, 
"Funeral Services." In one of its footnotes the court states that "[i)t is unclear whether the 
enactment of Virginia Code§ 54.1-2807(B) has abrogated the dicta in Goldman which in-
dicated that a widow's wishes should prevail over other family members with regard to 
disposition of her deceased spouse." Id. at 682 n.6. However, as noted in footnote 176, su-
pra, it appears doubtful that the General Assembly, by enacting section 54.1-2807(B) as a 
part of legislation intended to regulate funeral homes, also intended thereby to abrogate 
the Goldman dicta regarding the rights of family members between themselves. 
189. Id. at 683. 
190. See supra Part 11.B. 
191. See supra Part II.I. 
192. See supra Part 11.B. 
193. See supra Part 11.H. 
194. See supra Part 11.C. 
195. See supra Part IV.B. 
